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Abstract—With the advent of the Internet of Things, body-
worn sensor nodes are continuously becoming more important.
In case of bio-medical, rescue-worker or military applications
sensitive data are often transmitted, requiring the need for
encryption. The distribution of symmetric encryption keys is
often an issue leading to security risks. Body-worn sensor nodes
are generally employed in quickly varying channel conditions due
to body movement. The radio-communication channel between
such nodes is however reciprocal, allowing the extraction of an
array of similar channel measurements at both ends of the link.
These data can be used to build equal encryption keys at both link
ends without the need for actual over-the-air key distribution.
This paper studies the practical performance of an enhanced
channel-based key generation system with a very short round-
trip delay, allowing reciprocal channel assessment with increased
accuracy. Measurements were performed using the new system
and the results of the enhanced key generation are evaluated.
Although the performance is slightly increased thanks to the
shorter round-trip delay, the accuracy of the signal level detector
still imposes limits.
Index Terms—sensor nodes, key generation, encryption, an-
tenna, propagation, measurement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Body-worn sensor nodes are important for many modern-
day applications, including health care, biomedical, military
and rescue-worker systems. With the upcoming Internet of
Things (IoT), wireless sensor nodes, including wearable nodes,
will become more ubiquitous. A need for encryption exists
because of the sensitivity of the data which are often trans-
mitted. A set of algorithms is available for larger platforms
to distribute symmetrical keys, but they are often prone to
attacks and are also computationally demanding for wireless
sensor nodes, employing low-profile low-power processors.
In the link between body-worn wireless sensor nodes, the
radio-communication channel varies rapidly due to a number
of physical causes. First of all, fading and shadowing is
caused by the continuous movement of the nodes. Employing,
e.g., the popular 2.45 GHz band as a working frequency,
the wavelength is only 12 cm leading to quickly occurring
maxima and minima, caused by alternating constructive and
destructive interference of signals reflected in the environment.
Such channel variations can lead to signal variation up to
35 dB. Additional shadowing occurs due to objects in the
environment, as well as by the human body itself. Reorien-
tation and changes of posture also result in a redirection of
the antenna patterns, resulting in even more signal variation.
The radio channel employed by both users is reciprocal and
hence also the channel variations. In case channel variation
by the natural body movements is not fast enough, faster
key generation can be obtained by means of reconfigurable
antennas [1].
Theoretically, signal measurements performed at both link
ends should be equal and therefore provide a direct source
for unique symmetric key generation based on the channel
behavior. The channel variation can indeed be considered
random, unpredictable, and also unique for the legitimately
communicating parties, further called Alice and Bob. An
eavesdropper, further named Eve, does not share the same
physical channel and therefore cannot record the same channel
variations when intercepting the signals [2], [3].
In a practical application, there is however a small delay
between reciprocal channel measurements. Common off-the-
shelf wireless sensor transceivers operate in half-duplex mode,
alternately switching between transmit (TX) and receive (RX)
mode. Often the delay between reciprocal channel measure-
ments is several milliseconds, allowing significant channel
variation between both measurements [4]. Even if the mea-
surement time slot is smaller than the coherence time of the
channel, significant variation regularly occurs during signal
notches caused by destructive interference within the measure-
ment interval. This phenomenon leads to reduced measurement
accuracy and key errors, ultimately compromising the key-
generation rate due to the required thresholding to lower the
Key Error Rate (KER).
In this paper the time slot for reciprocal channel measure-
ment is reduced by almost an order of magnitude, to 614 µs
instead of 5 ms in earlier publications [4]–[6]. This is possible
thanks to an embedded software update on the wireless nodes,
enabling the automatic TX-to-RX and RX-to-TX turnaround
mode of the ADF7242 transceiver.
Because of the much faster turnaround time, channel mea-
surements are expected to be more accurate, resulting in a
lower KER and an improved key-generation rate. However, the
measurements illustrate that although a limited improvement is
obtained, the performance gain is less than expected. Clearly,
other non-identified causes of non-reciprocity are further lim-
iting the key generation.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Measurement nodes
The wireless nodes employed for key generation are fully
wearable units, composed of an RF circuit integrated onto
a textile patch antenna. The circuit employs the Analog
Devices ADF7242 transceiver, directly connected to the feed
points of the dual-polarized textile antenna. The circuit further
includes a Silicon Laboratories C8051F920 low-power low-
profile micro controller, 1 Mbit Electrically Erasable and
Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) as well as a
three-axis accelerometer with ±3 g measurement range. The
wearable node also includes a thin battery and hence is fully
autonomous without any wired connections.
The front and back side of the nodes are visible in Fig. 1.
Both nodes are operational and exchange packets in order to
perform reciprocal channel estimations every 100 ms. Their
signals are picked up by the Printed-Circuit Board (PCB)
dipole antenna connected to the spectrum analyzer, which is
configured in zero span to present a time domain plot of the
received power.
Fig. 1. Rohde & Schwartz FSV40 spectrum analyzer receiving the signals
of the pair of wearable wireless nodes employed for key generation.
The measurement results are more clearly visible in the
screenshot presented in Fig. 2. Alice’s node is standing up,
with its radiating patch facing towards the dipole, whereas
Bob’s node is laying face down on the table. The measurement
is triggered by the first rising edge of the measured power,
occurring at 0 µs, caused by Alice’s transmission. Marker
M1 shows the length of Alice’s transmission, being 428 µs,
together with a received power of −31 dBm. Marker M2
displays the start of Bob’s responding transmission at 614 µs,
defining the separation of the reciprocal channel measurements
in the time domain. Note that Bob’s signal produces a received
power of −45 dBm on the dipole, 14 dB less strong than
Alice’s signal due to the difference in orientation of the
antennas. Bob’s packets are equal in length to Alice’s packets
and therefore his transmission also lasts 428 µs.
Transmissions are performed in IEEE802.15.4 mode, al-
lowing a very reliable communication, with data integrity
guaranteed by means of a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC).
Fig. 2. Time-domain plot of the reciprocally transmitted signals, as captured
by a Rohde & Schwartz FSV40 spectrum analyzer, displaying the 614 µs
TX-RX turnaround time.
The transmission header consists of a preamble sequence and
the Start Frame Delimiter (SFD). The channel measurement is
performed during 128 µs, immediately following the SFD. The
average value is transferred to the micro controller as an 8-bit
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) value expressing
the received power in dBm. The measurement has a resolution
of 1 dB and a specified accuracy of ±3 dB [7].
B. Body-worn measurement setup
In the measurement for channel-based key generation, the
nodes are worn on the torso of Alice and Bob. The nodes
are taped on the front side of two T-shirts and are so flat and
flexible that the wearers hardly notice their presence. Alice
and Bob then perform a random walk for half an hour in a
lab environment.
Measurements are performed first for a Line of Sight (LoS)
path between Alice and Bob, and are then repeated for a Non
Line of Sight (NLoS) path. The latter path is created by placing
an array of radio frequency absorbers between the trajectories
covered by Alice and Bob.
Measurements are performed without an eavesdropper (Eve)
for several reasons. Eve cannot reliably detect and process the
packets transmitted with a gap of only 186µs in between. The
reduced round-trip delay does not make key extraction for the
eavesdropper easier.
To allow faster operation, measurements by Alice and Bob
are now directly saved to local EEPROM memory for later
readout and post processing. Furthermore, the inability of an
eavesdropper to extract RSSI measurements allowing to crack
the key has already been shown in [4].
III. MEASUREMENT RESULTS
A. Time-domain behavior
The time-domain plot in Fig. 3 displays an extract of a set
of 16859 reciprocal channel measurements, performed during
the following operational sequence:
• Alice transmits a packet.
• Bob receives this packet and measures the RSSI.
• Bob acknowledges reception by transmitting a packet,
614µs after Alice’s start of transmission.
• Alice receives this packet and measures the RSSI at
614µs.
• Bob acknowledges reception a second time, by transmit-
ting a packet 5 ms after Alice’s start of transmission.
• Alice receives this packet and measures the RSSI at 5 ms.
Clearly the figure displays measurements that match well,
with sporadic deviations. The measurement with smaller
turnaround delay is often more accurate, showing more reci-
procity, as is the case in the event marked ’B’. Here, Alice’s
channel measurement at 614µs accurately follows the fading
dip measured by Bob, whereas this is not the case for the
measurement after 5 ms.
However, other deviations remain, as for example marked
by ’A’. There, both channel measurements by Alice fit well,
but Bob’s measurement is off by up to 10 dB. The cause of
this repetitive phenomenon will be further analyzed in this
paper. Clearly it is not caused by static system imbalances.
The figure is representative for the signal behavior in the full
set of 16859 measurement points.






















Fig. 3. A small extract of the reciprocal NLoS channel measurement
performed by Bob and then by Alice, 614µs and 5 ms later.
B. Statistics and mutual information
The correlation coefficients for the RSSI values measured
by Alice and Bob at time intervals of 614µs and 5 ms are
calculated for the values expressed in dBm, as these are the
values which are directly used by the quantizer. Table I shows
that the correlation is slightly higher with the reduced measure-
ment interval. Of course, the correlation is already very high
for both cases, illustrating the large, but not perfect, reciprocity
of the channel measurements. The mutual information between
Alice and Bob’s sets of values is listed in Table II. The mutual
information is expressed in bits per channel sample and is
slightly higher for channel measurements with the reduced
measurement interval. The increase of correlation and mutual
information thanks to the shorter measurement interval is
however only around 1%.
TABLE I
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ALICE AND BOB’S RSSI VALUES,
FOR LOS AND NLOS, AT 614µS AND 5000µS MEASUREMENT INTERVALS




MUTUAL INFORMATION BETWEEN ALICE AND BOB’S RSSI VALUES, FOR
LOS AND NLOS, AT 614µS AND 5000µS MEASUREMENT INTERVALS
∆t1 = 614µs ∆t2 = 5 ms
LoS 1.2703 bit 1.2091 bit
NLoS 1.2648 bit 1.1960 bit
C. Key generation
In order to generate practical keys, the following procedure
is used. A quantizer at Alice’s side extracts one bit per channel
measurement according to the following steps:
• Determine the moving average of the last 70 RSS values
(corresponding to the average over the last 7 s) [4].
• If the current RSS value crosses a threshold of N dB
above or below this value, a 1 or a 0 key bit is generated,
respectively. Alice informs Bob about the generation of
a key bit via the wireless channel, without revealing the
actual value of the bit.
• In case the threshold is not crossed, no key bit is
generated.
Bob’s quantizer also extracts one bit per channel measure-
ment:
• Determine the moving average of the last 70 RSS values.
• If Bob is informed by Alice that she has generated a key
bit, Bob also generates a key bit:
– A 1-bit is generated if Bob’s measured RSS value is
above the moving average
– A 0-bit is generated otherwise
Higher threshold levels result in better matching raw keys,
but limit the key generation rate as more measurements are
dropped. The raw keys also need further reconciliation to
exactly match. The (11, 7)-Hamming forward error correcting
code is employed to achieve this. After pseudo-random bit
interleaving, Alice’s raw key, considered the master key, is
subdivided into 11-bit groups. For each group, four Hamming
check bits are transmitted to Bob, allowing Bob to correct
key errors. Finally, de-interleaving is performed to undo the
interleaving. Interleaving scrambles bits in pseudo-random
order to spread subsequent key errors over a large number of
code words, improving the performance of the reconciliation
algorithm.
D. Key Error Rate after reconciliation
The resulting KER after reconciliation is displayed in Fig. 4
for the NLoS measurement and in Fig. 5 for the LoS scenario.
The advantage of faster reciprocal measurements is only
























KER @ 614 µs
KER @ 5 ms
Fig. 4. Key Error Rate (KER) for the Non Line-of-Sight (NLoS) measurement
after reconciliation with various thresholds, for reciprocal channel measure-
ments within 5 ms and 614µs.
























KER @ 614 µs
KER @ 5 ms
Fig. 5. Key Error Rate (KER) for the Line-of-Sight (LoS) measurement after
reconciliation with various thresholds, for reciprocal channel measurements
within 5 ms and 614µs.
visible in the NLoS measurement. Apparently the channel
variation in the LoS case is not fast enough in order to obtain
a further improvement at 614µs measurement interval instead
of 5 ms. In the NLoS case an improvement is obtained, with a
zero KER occurring at a threshold level of 7 dB for the 614µs
measurement interval, instead of 9 dB for the 5 ms interval.
Corresponding to earlier indoor measurements [6], the KER
decreases with a steeper slope for the LoS case, compared to
the NLoS case.
E. Analysis of measurement accuracy
In order to study the nature of the remaining measurement
inaccuracies, the average response of Alice and Bob’s detec-
tors is displayed in Fig. 6. The graph shows the average of the
signal strengths in dBm as measured by Alice, corresponding
to each set of equal signal values measured by Bob. For ex-
ample, each time Bob measures a signal level of −60 dBm the
corresponding signal level measured by Alice is collected and
the average of all these collected values is represented in the
graph as the corresponding average value for Alice’s detector.
Note that the NLoS and LoS measurements both have 16859
and 19958 measurement points, respectively. Compared to the
LoS measurement, the range of signal levels is more limited
for NLoS, due to the higher attenuation in the propagation
path. The average response of the detectors matches very well
over the whole range of the measurement, corresponding to
the ±3 dB accuracy mentioned in the data sheet [7] of the
transceiver chip.




























LoS   614 µs
Fig. 6. The average response of the reciprocal detectors at 614µs measure-
ment interval.
A histogram of the errors for the NLoS and LoS mea-
surements is displayed in Fig. 7. The error value in dB is
defined as the difference between the signal levels measured by
Alice and Bob, with the 614µs interval. The LoS measurement
is truncated to 16859 signal values, in order to make both
data series equal in length. The histograms of the errors are
very similar for NLoS and LoS propagation, both showing a
symmetric distribution. Around 80% of the errors are within
±3 dB and around 90% of errors within ±6 dB, corresponding
to the detector’s specifications. The errors of reciprocal mea-
surements performed each 100 ms are also not correlated in
time, with larger errors appearing sporadically and at random.




















LoS   614 µs
Fig. 7. Histogram of the difference between Alice and Bob’s measurements
for both time intervals.
IV. DISCUSSION
The research and development to obtain faster reciprocal
channel measurements, as outlined in this paper, was per-
formed with the expectation that measurements performed by
Alice and Bob would match significantly better with only
614µs delay in between them, compared to 5 ms in previous
publications [6]. However, the improvement in practical key
generation is limited and only visible for the measurement in
NLoS conditions, where the threshold level for a zero KER is
2 dB lower, resulting in fewer discarded channel samples and
hence a higher key-generation rate.
Measurements at the faster measurement interval are shown
to be more accurate, with a slightly higher correlation co-
efficient and a comparably increased mutual information for
the measurement sets recorded by Alice and Bob. As the
improvement by decreasing the measurement time by an order
of magnitude is limited, the channel is clearly sampled fast
enough for body centric propagation conditions.
The remaining differences in measurements performed by
Alice and Bob are therefore not due to channel variation
within the measurement time. The correlation for both channel
measurements performed by Alice at 614µs and 5 ms is as
high as 0.95 and hence significantly higher than the correla-
tion between Bob’s measurements and Alice’s measurements
despite the much shorter time interval of 614µs.
Static imbalances cannot cause the sporadically occurring
deviations between measurements performed by Alice and
Bob. Moreover, an analysis of the average signal levels de-
tected by Alice corresponding to each set of equal signal
levels measured by Bob resulted in an accurate characteristic,
revealing little static system imbalance.
A potential issue is the fact that the ADF7242 transceiver’s
impedance at the antenna port differs a lot depending on
the receiving or transmitting state, the data sheet [7] lists
74.3 − 10.7jΩ and 43.7 − 35.2jΩ, respectively. Possibly the
variable capacitive loading of the antenna’s matching circuit
due to the proximity of the human body has effects which are
different depending on the receiving or transmitting state. This
phenomenon is currently being further investigated, but is not
expected to be the main source of remaining differences in
reciprocal measurements.
A further analysis of the measurements displays a symmet-
ric distribution of the measurement errors, which are defined
as the difference in signal levels measured by Alice and Bob,
separated in time by 614µs. Considering that 90% of the
errors are within ±6 dB, combined with the symmetric error
distribution with rapidly decreasing probability for the larger
measurement errors, the remaining errors in the reciprocal
channel measurements are likely due to the inaccuracy of the
transceiver chip’s signal level detector. This detector is not
developed or specified as a measurement device but merely as
a means of received signal strength indication.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Reciprocal channel measurements performed by body-worn
sensor nodes can be used to extract encryption keys. This was
documented in earlier publications, where some differences
in channel measurement values remained. It was assumed
that fast channel variation was the cause of these differences,
considering the reciprocal measurements were separated 5 ms
in time.
The embedded software of the body-worn sensor nodes was
modified, allowing to reduce the interval at which reciprocal
channel measurements are performed by almost an order of
magnitude, from 5 ms (in previous publications) to 614 µs.
A measurement campaign was organized, collecting large
measurement sets for Line of Sight as well as Non Line of
Sight propagation conditions.
The measurements successfully reproduce earlier results,
with correlation and mutual information slightly improved
thanks to the faster reciprocal channel measurements. How-
ever, only a limited performance enhancement is observed for
practical key generation. The enhancement only occurs in case
of a Non Line-of-Sight propagation path, where the threshold
level required for a zero key error rate is reduced by 2 dB.
Further apparent non-reciprocity in the channel measurements
can probably be attributed to inaccuracy of the received signal
strength indication in the transceiver chip.
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